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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this report is twofold. First, in section 2, I will describe Ethiopia’s economic 
performance as of today and the expected future development. This part focuses on expected 
economic growth and on the impact on the economy of the expected increase in inflation, the 
increase in oil prices, the removal of petroleum subsidies and the suspension of Direct Budget 
Support (DBS) by donors. Second, in section 3, I will discuss the challenges for the Ethiopian 
poverty reduction strategy and the aims therein. This part assesses the poverty analysis in the 
PASDEP and whether this is coherent with the strategies, to what degree the growth strategies are 
pro-poor, the prospects for poverty reduction and finally how PASDEP balances growth with 
distributional issues. Section 4 then points out some issues that could be followed up.  
2. Economic performance and future prospects 
The purpose of this section is to discuss Ethiopia’s present economic performance and its expected 
economic development. This section contains, in line with the ToR, an overview of economic 
growth prospects and its rural/urban distribution (section 2.1), a discussion of possible 
consequences for the macroeconomic environment of increasing inflation (section 2.2), the impact 
of increased oil prices on the Government’s budget (section 2.3), prospects for Ethiopian exports, 
and finally, a discussion of the macroeconomic impacts of the suspension of Direct Budget Support 
(section 2.5). 
2.1 Economic growth prospects 
The agricultural sector in Ethiopia contributed around 48 % to GDP in 2004/05 (IMF 2006a), 
employs 85 % of the population, and is largely rain fed (PASDEP 2006). Hence, the country’s 
growth performance in a single year is highly dependent on the weather conditions for agriculture. 
Figure 1 below illustrates this point, and highlights the importance both of assessing the growth 
trends over several years and of decomposing the growth rate into different sectors in order to get a 
proper picture of the future prospects.  
 
Figure 1. Real GDP per capita (Ethiopian Birr). Source: World Bank (2006a) 
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Despite being a very rough smoothing of the data points in figure 1, the recent trend seems to be a 
sharp increase in GDP in Ethiopia after the drought-induced recession. The average annual 
population growth was approximately 2.2 % between 1998 and 2004, and the increase in real GDP 
per capita from 2003/04 has substantially improved the wellbeing of many Ethiopians. The 
preliminary IMF figures show that per capita growth in GDP in 2003/04 was 9.1%, for the 
following year 6.7 %, and is expected to be 2.9 % for 2005/06. The perception that many Ethiopians 
have experienced improvements in economic wellbeing is supported by a disaggregation of the 
growth figures as shown in table 1 below, which indicates that all sectors have prospered. 
 
 
Table 1. Selected macroeconomic indicators. Source: World Bank (2006a). 
 
 
 
 
The rural sector, which consists almost entirely of agriculture, has experienced large volatilities. 
The drought in 2001/02-2002/03 caused a reduction in GDP from agriculture of almost 14 %. 
Despite a growth of 3–5 % in industry and services (generally located in the urban sector), which 
contributed 57 % to GDP, the national GDP dropped by 4 % during those years.1 In the aftermath of 
economic crises like drought we usually see a rebound in GDP that materialises in high economic 
growth rates. This may be nothing more than production picking up and returning to normal levels, 
which is what happened to a large extent in Ethiopia in 2003/04 with agricultural growth of 17 %. 
However, the subsequent growth in 2004/05 of 12 % is rather strong and lifted the incomes 
produced in the agricultural sector far above the pre-drought level.  
 
The urban sector, industry and services, confirms that Ethiopia has had a very strong and broad 
growth performance during recent years. Industry and services have grown between 6 % and 7 % 
annually over the last two years. Interestingly, the growth in industry has been stable at between 5 
% and 7 % since 2000/01, and is projected to be above 6 % for 2005/06. A similar picture can be 
drawn for services with growth between 3 % and 6 % during the last three years and projected to 
land at 5 % this year. Again, it seems to be slow growth in the agricultural sector that is the main 
cause of the lower overall growth in 2005/06, which is expected to come out at 5 %.  
                                                     
1 I have not found any formal division between the urban and rural sectors. The PASDEP states that “The contribution of 
urban areas to the Ethiopian economy can be approximated with the share of industry and services in GDP, as those are 
generally located in urban areas”, and I have used this approach. 
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The projected overall growth rate for 2006/07 is in line with 2005/06 and will probably be around 5 
%, which gives a per capita increase in GDP of a little less than 3 %.2 This figure may become 
higher if foreign aid is increased in line with the intentions indicated before the political turmoil, 
provided that the situation is calmed and the polarisation in the Ethiopian society is reduced. 
Finally, if we look at the whole period from 1999/2000 to 2004/05 growth averaged about 5 % p.a. 
while average per capita growth was 2.1 % p.a. 
2.2 The impact of rising inflation on macroeconomic prospects 
Non-food inflation, measured by the annual increase in the consumer prices of non-food items (non-
food CPI), shows that Ethiopia has had a rather sound price change pattern. This probably reflects 
the macroeconomic policies of the Government in recent years, and the level of inflation is well 
within a sound range. The non-food price increase has been between 1.6 % and 5.4 % p.a. during 
the last 6 years (see table 1 above). Moreover, the modelling framework that assesses different 
scenarios for the Millennium Development Goals aims to contain annual inflation below 7.5 percent 
despite a large increase in foreign aid (IMF 2006). 
  
On the other hand, the highly variable food CPI reflects the volatilities in agriculture. For these 
items the price change has ranged from a 13 % drop to a 25 % increase, and this creates large 
problems for consumers and producers in adapting and planning for future economic dispositions. 
The reason for the lower food prices in 2000/01 and 2001/02 seems to be that the demand for 
agricultural products was lower (UN 2002), but also that agricultural production was higher in these 
years. Hence, rural incomes declined, which in turn forced many farmers to cut back on spending, 
and this reinforced the deflationary pressure. The drought that fully impacted on agriculture in 
2002/03 and resulted in a failed harvest for very many farmers then put upward pressure on grain 
prices, causing the peak food CPI rise of 25 % in that year. 
 
However, it is important to underline that coping with this problem of fluctuating prices necessitates 
both macroeconomic stabilisation policies and improved agricultural policies. With respect to the 
former, it is necessary that rural farmers are insured against bad harvests, and that they have the 
ability to draw on financial resources during drought periods in order to avoid selling off productive 
assets and to get production up and going as fast as possible. Moreover, making financial services 
available to farmers will also facilitate the development of the farms to persist droughts, such as the 
construction of irrigation systems. With respect to the latter, we will return to agricultural policies in 
more detail in section 3. Note, however, that such policies may prevent large drops in economic 
growth during droughts, and, needless to say, could prevent much human suffering. 
 
Recently, at the end of 2005, consumer prices increased quite rapidly and have been estimated to be 
running at 11.7 % during the last 12 months. The peak is again influenced by the fact that food 
prices have been increasing more rapidly than other commodities, but the large increase in oil prices 
has also contributed considerably. However, inflation is expected to be reduced in line with the 
Government’s actions, and is predicted to be 10.8 % for the year 2005/06 and to decline thereafter 
to 6-7 % (IMF 2006). Moreover, the IMF has indicated that the Government’s proposals for 
securing macro stability are adequate. 
 
In light of the expected increase in aid flows to Ethiopia it is important to keep an eye on inflation 
in the future. However, it is expected that much of the aid will finance investment in development 
infrastructure, which to a large extent relies on imports. Since this usage of aid will dampen the 
                                                     
2 The World Bank CAS operates with a per capita growth that is slightly higher for the two last years –  3.8 % and 3.6 %, 
respectively. However, these figures are a few months older that the IMF figures referred to above. 
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inflationary pressure, inflation is not expected to become a problem. The IMF mentions that 
Ethiopia should be careful not to allow too rapid an expansion of domestic credit in this situation 
due to the inflationary risks, but at the present time this seems to be under the government’s control 
(IMF 2006). Nevertheless, Ethiopia’s huge ambitions on economic development pose large 
challenges in managing monetary policies and developing the appropriate instruments for liquidity 
forecasting and bank supervision (IMF 2006). 
2.3 The impact of rising oil prices 
Ethiopia does not use much petroleum fuel. Approximately 95 % of the energy consumed is derived 
from traditional energy resources, while the remaining 5 % consists of electricity and oil products. 
Nevertheless, about a third of the 40 % increase in imports into Ethiopia in 2004/05 stems from the 
rise in fuel costs, and the oil price has increased even more since then. Hence, the increase in the oil 
price has contributed significantly to the widening current account deficit. Moreover, although oil’s 
share of total energy consumption is low, it is expected that its share will rise as the country 
becomes more developed. Note also that Ethiopia has been totally dependent on imports to meet its 
requirements for all types of petroleum products since the Assab refinery was closed in 1997. 
 
The assessment of the impact of rising oil prices, whether as a result of increasing international oil 
prices or removal of domestic subsidies, should be separated into two categories. The first is the 
short-term effects, which are the direct impacts that can often be observed. In accordance with the 
ToR, I will confine this section to discussing the impacts on the Government’s budget. Second, the 
possible long-term impacts of a high oil price are discussed in relation to the long-term development 
of Ethiopia. 
Short-term impacts on the budget 
One important immediate impact of a rise in oil prices is the increase in government expenditure on 
implementing the activities specified in its budgets and action plans. The implication of this is that 
either the government must reduce its ambitions in the areas affected by the increased oil price and 
cut back on the activities, or they must redirect resources from other parts of the budget. However, a 
reduction in subsidies on petroleum products works in the opposite way, giving more funds to 
prioritised government expenditure. 
 
The government’s expenditure on domestic fuel has soared since the increase in world oil prices 
mainly because it has kept fuel rates constant since December 2004. This subsidy has been growing 
with the rise in the oil price since the government is not in a position to reduce much of this 
consumption. Hence, the most likely impact is that the extra cost will have to be covered by other 
sectors and other government expenditures reduced accordingly. 
 
One development goal that is particularly vulnerable to increases in oil prices is the development of 
roads and transport services since oil is a necessary ingredient in bitumen and fuel. It is important to 
construct roads and provide transport services in order to lower the transport costs of inputs and 
outputs for producers in more remote areas, and hence to increase their profits and wages for 
workers, and in order to make goods and public and private services more accessible for consumers. 
Moreover, a proper transport system facilitates mobility in the job market – people in remote areas 
can more easily take jobs in urban areas in times of hardship in the village.  
 
The challenge for constructing roads when oil prices are increasing is first and foremost related to 
the cost of bitumen. In Ethiopia, the rise in the cost of oil has induced an increase in the price of 
bitumen that has doubled the per meter cost of constructing a road. Hence, for the same road 
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construction budget Ethiopia can only afford to build half of the number of kilometres of tarred 
roads as before the oil price increase.3 
 
Another important effect of rising oil prices is that the already strained balance of payments is 
worsened, and this affects the Government’s ability to purchase imported goods necessary to 
implement the strategies in PASDEP. Ethiopia is reliant on a few crops for foreign exchange 
earnings and receives 80 % of its foreign currency from agricultural export commodities. The 
foreign exchange earnings are way below what is necessary to pay for the imports, and this problem 
is worsened by the fact that many of the export crops are highly vulnerable to adverse weather 
conditions. Historically, the gap between export earnings and import outlays has largely been 
covered by foreign aid, but the problem is now more acute due to the freeze in direct budget 
support. The problem of an increasing currency account deficit is also aggravated by the increased 
demand for imports due to fast economic growth and the government’s ambitious infrastructural 
investment programme, which requires substantial imports. 
 
The Government has taken measures to improve the balance of payments, and the main instruments 
have been stringent import controls, a large reduction in subsidies on retail gasoline prices and a 
postponement of public investments. One serious implication of the rise in oil prices and the other 
factors causing the lack of sufficient foreign exchange, is that the Government has delayed portions 
of its public investment plan in energy and telecom in order to maintain macroeconomic stability. 
Hence, developing electric infrastructure has been postponed. This could result in many poor people 
waiting even longer for connection since it will delay the ambitious rural electrification programme 
that intends to extend the grid to the rural areas where most of the poor are living. Only 17 % of the 
people are connected to the electricity grid (PASDEP 2006). However, it is not clear whether the 
investments in electricity are intended to connect poor people or whether they will favour the better 
off. If connecting new residents to the grid follows the existing pattern, then we would expect that 
the postponement would have little impact on the poor since the current distribution of electricity 
consumption is highly skewed towards higher income households. 
 
The government has reduced subsidies on oil and gas products, which, according to the IMF, will 
help reduce inflation (IMF 2006). The explanation for this counter-intuitive prediction may be that 
the reduction in demand that follows the increased expenditure on petroleum products will 
counteract the direct effect from the increased prices of petroleum products. Note also that 
consumption of fuel is heavily skewed towards higher income levels, which are important in 
determining overall demand and hence prices. Moreover, government spending on petroleum 
subsidies could be used for pro-poor expenditures, such as basic services and infrastructure, and 
would in this case be more effective in reducing poverty. In addition, subsidies generally change 
relative prices in an inefficient manner. The Government can achieve more development for the 
same budget if it reduces bottlenecks for the different industries that need oil instead of subsidising 
oil. Taken together, it seems wise not to subsidise petroleum products and to focus government 
spending on targeted development efforts and on basic services important to the majority of the 
population.  
 
The IMF has indicated that the government’s proposals for maintaining macroeconomic stability are 
appropriate for meeting the balance of payments challenge. However, curbing spending that 
requires foreign exchange may slow down the pace of development in the longer term. This is 
addressed next.  
                                                     
3 Assuming that the cost per kilometre is constant. 
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Long-term impacts 
As noted above, rising oil prices increase the currency deficit. In the longer run, however, this may 
not be a problem in itself. It is expected that the political situation will stabilise, and the World 
Bank has already suggested that the government is on the right track towards restoring normal 
relations with the donor community. Hence, the donor community is expected to normalise aid 
disbursement in the longer term. The adjustments that the Government has embarked on are said by 
the IMF to be satisfactory to maintain macroeconomic balance. But even though the balance of 
payments may be positive in the long run, a high oil price makes it more difficult for Ethiopia to 
reach its development goals since oil is a crucial ingredient in much of these efforts. 
 
One long-term impact of a rising oil price, or a constant high price level, is that pressure will be 
created for the privatisation of road construction so that government funds can be used for other 
purposes. This is not a rational response since the bill for having the road built has to be paid 
anyway, but this has already been raised as a proposal by the World Bank (World Bank 2006b). 
Another long-term impact is that fewer tarred roads will probably be built and more gravel roads, 
and this could lead to large maintenance costs and challenges that could hamper development. 
Similarly, it will be more difficult to improve other components of the transport system and fewer 
will be able to use motorised transport and traction. Transport costs have increased sharply due to 
the large rise in the oil price, and this limits the markets for inputs, goods and services that will 
constitute an even larger barrier against people interacting in market exchange. Moreover, the 
traditional system of using oxen for draught power for land development, tillage, threshing and 
transport (equines) will continue. Taken together, it will be even more difficult for the government 
to develop the subsistence economy that prevails in large parts of Ethiopia. 
 
On the other hand, the increase in the oil price may also create new opportunities in Ethiopia. When 
the oil price increases, so does its natural substitutes, and energy prices have moved in tandem with 
the oil price. Hence, it becomes more attractive to exploit alternative energy resources. Ethiopia is 
endowed with hydroelectric power, coal, biomass, solar energy and natural gas, and possibly oil and 
geothermal energy. According to PASDEP 2006, only 2-4 % of Ethiopia’s total potential for 
hydroelectric power generation has been developed, and this amounts to 15,000-30,000 MW. 
Another opportunity lies in natural gas exploitation. Reserves are estimated to be 24 million cubic 
metres and that may be sufficient for nitrogen-based fertilizer production. 
 
Energy extraction in Ethiopia offers considerable potential, but also major challenges in human 
resources, know-how and technology. However, we see a growing interest from abroad in the 
energy sector in Ethiopia that may facilitate development of these resources. One example is the 
World Bank, which will embark on an assessment of the potential for a massive increase in the 
production of ethanol and biodiesel (World Bank 2006b). Another example is that the Ethiopian 
government has signed a contract with a big Chinese firm, China National Complete Plant Import & 
Export Corporation, to study the potential reserve for a coal mine in Yayu, Oromia state to produce 
urea fertilizer. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that most Ethiopian soils are deficit in nutrients, and that the application 
of nitrogen and phosphorus fertilizer has increased crop yields significantly. However, the 
production of nitrogen-based fertilizer is energy intensive (natural gas) and is one of the most price-
sensitive commodities with respect to oil prices. Ethiopia imported 200,000 tons of urea fertilizer 
(46 % nitrogen) at a cost of 60 million US dollars in 2005. As the average price for 2006 is expected 
to increase by 20-25 %, Ethiopia is expecting to pay 12-15 million US dollars more this year for the 
same amount of fertilizer. To illustrate the magnitudes: the total cost for Ethiopia of the urea 
fertilizer in 2005 would require almost 8 % of all its export earnings generated in 2004/05. 
Moreover, the government’s aim is to increase substantially the use of this type of fertilizer. Hence, 
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one important input into modern agricultural activity has become much more costly after the 
increase in oil prices and poses a severe hindrance to one of the main strategies for developing 
Ethiopia – rural development and improved agricultural productivity. 
2.4 Prospects for exports from Ethiopia 
In section 2.1 we underlined the importance of agriculture for achieving stable growth in Ethiopia, 
and note that 90 % of the poor make their living in agriculture. In this section we go into somewhat 
more detail on the prospects for agricultural growth in the short and medium run through exports, 
and we assess the prospects of other activities that may bring more foreign exchange into the 
country. In the long run it is clear that the importance of agriculture for the economy and poverty 
reduction will be reduced. However, it takes time to complete a transition in which uneducated 
subsistence farmers move to paid skilled labour. 
 
The major export products from Ethiopia in 2004/05 were coffee (41 %), oilseeds (13 %), Khat4 (12 
%), leather and leather products (8 %), gold (6 %) and pulses (4 %). The prospects for coffee 
production are not very promising in the long run, for at least four reasons. First, as the incomes of 
the countries that import coffee grow, the demand for coffee grows less. Hence, it is not expected 
that there will be any large increase in coffee demand, and increasing production would bring the 
price down. Second, the price of coffee would increase little even if the demand should increase, 
and hence the revenue for farmers will not increase very much even in the best growth scenarios. 
Third, the price of coffee has gone down relative to the price of the goods that Ethiopia imports. 
Coffee provided 65% of Ethiopia’s export earnings a decade ago, but this is now down to 41 % due 
to the lower prices – even if the coffee price in 2004/05 was at its highest in the last 5 years.  Hence, 
Ethiopia today can buy substantially less oil, machinery, fertilizer and equipment from abroad for 
the same amount of coffee production compared to a decade ago. Fourth, international commodity 
agreements have not fared well. Coffee-producing countries have tried to organise themselves in 
cartels similar to what OPEC did for oil, in order to stabilise prices at a higher level. However, the 
initiatives have largely been ignored by the coffee producers because it is more costly for them to 
reduce production as compared to oil production, and it seems that there is a long way to go before 
such an arrangement can be established. 
 
In the medium and short run, however, it is important to note that coffee exports are a necessity for 
bringing in foreign exchange. Several actions can be taken to improve the earnings from coffee in 
such a perspective. First, note that the coffee price is very volatile, as is illustrated by the 62 % 
increase in the coffee export price for Ethiopian farmers that they experienced between 2002/03 and 
2004/05. Hence, the producers need to be able to build up income buffers in good times to draw on 
when the coffee price is low, or when the crop fails. Given the poor functioning of financial markets 
in Ethiopia, and the fact that most farmers avoid taking risks, this problem may be a substantial 
hindrance for increasing coffee production in the short run. Moreover, there are several hindrances 
for expansion in coffee; most of them are addressed in the PASDEP and will not be discussed here. 
 
The scenario for all other major export products of Ethiopia suffers from the same conclusions as 
drawn for coffee, except for the fact that the price of pulses has remained remarkably stable over the 
last 6 years. However, it is very difficult to assess future opportunities in agriculture. Who predicted 
the enormous rise in horticulture in many African countries, especially fresh cut flowers, which 
have now also taken off in Ethiopia? It is clear that the demand for these products rises rapidly with 
increased incomes, and it is expected to be a lucrative business in the future. Moreover, given the 
high transport costs from Ethiopia to the world market, it may be worthwhile assessing whether 
                                                     
4 The traditional khat is a leafy shrub that has psychotropic qualities when chewed. 
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such low weight/high price commodities as fresh cut flowers and spices can be produced on a large 
scale in Ethiopia. 
 
Tourism has grown to be one of the most important foreign exchange earning sectors worldwide and 
is now the fourth largest export article even if we exclude air travel costs. In particular, tourism to 
Africa has the highest growth rate – 10 % more tourists travelled to Africa last year and 11 % more 
in the first four months of 2006. Uganda is one example where tourism has become the most 
important foreign currency earning sector, and is now bigger that the second and third most 
important sector combined. With its cultural heritage and magnificent scenery, Ethiopia has an 
enormous potential for developing its tourist industry and taking part in the huge growth in this 
sector. Needless to say, as the world becomes richer and richer, working time is reduced and people 
use more time and resources on their vacation. Hence, the increase in tourism will continue in the 
long run, and more and more people demand exotic travel destinations. This may be an opportunity 
for Ethiopia, and the PASDEP notes that the long-term vision of the Government is to make 
Ethiopia one of the top 10 tourist destinations in Africa. Moreover, a long list of concrete actions to 
attract more tourists is presented. However, there is strong competition among tourist destinations, 
and hard work must be undertaken by the government to provide the tourist facilities and intensive 
advertising is necessary in order to promote Ethiopia. In any case, any effort to attract more tourists 
would probably be wasted as long as domestic political tensions, famines, and potential armed 
conflicts with Eritrea and Somalia continue to be headlines in the international press. 
 
The mining sector has been underexploited in Ethiopia, even if gold is one of the major export 
commodities. Despite the often unfavourable relative price changes of raw materials, several of the 
products can generate huge income, diversify exports and bring badly needed foreign currency. 
Moreover, such development contributes to industrial development and employment opportunities 
in the small-scale mining sector that give the workers far higher incomes than traditional 
agriculture. Only 38 % of the country has been geological mapped, and the PASDEP lists a number 
of actions to increase coverage since many different mineral deposits have been identified. 
PASDEP notes that studies indicate that 400-500,000 people are engaged in artisan (gold and salt) 
mining in different parts of the country; and among these half are female. Even so, one should note 
that the major potential for the economy lies in the income that is generated in the mining business 
since it tends to employ relatively few people. 
2.5 Does the Protection of Basic Services programme compensate 
for the suspension of Direct Budget Support? 
The donor community has taken several actions in response to the political turmoil caused by the 
electoral irregularities during the May 2005 elections in Ethiopia and the mass arrests and human 
rights violations that followed. One important step was to halt Direct Budget Support (DBS) and 
use alternative forms of aid disbursement that “would provide greater oversight over poverty 
reducing expenditure and promote increased accountability”. Thus, it would be interesting to assess 
to what extent the alternative aid programme, the Protection of Basic Services (PBS)5 programme, 
compensated for the absence of DBS. However, it turned out to be a very difficult task to find 
information on the relative share of aid that should have gone as DBS to Ethiopia from the 
                                                     
5 Basic services are defined by the World Bank as follows: “basic services  is defined broadly to include services delivered 
at the sub-national level that directly contribute to poverty reduction or have a social impact (primary and secondary 
education, health, water supply & sanitation, rural roads, agricultural extension, labor, social welfare); services that 
contribute to poverty reduction via their impact on economic growth; and spending on core administrative services, 
without which budgets could not be prepared or approved, payments made, accounts maintained, etc, and which will be 
critical if the state’s accountability to its citizens is to be improved.” 
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suspension in late 2005/beginning of 2006 and two years ahead. The indications given in this 
section are therefore tentative and require further work in order to draw any firm conclusions. 
 
According to the World Bank Project Information Document of the PBS, this programme consists 
of four components that will run from 2005/06 to 2006/07: (1) funds for basic services, (2) 
provision of health commodities, (3) financial transparency and accountability, and (4) social 
accountability. In sum, the total cost of the programme, excluding the Government’s own spending, 
was planned to be approximately US$ 468 million over the two years. The aim of the PBS is to 
provide the required funding so that the Government does not have to cut pro-poor spending over 
the next two years, especially at the sub-national levels (regions, cities and local authorities). 
However, according to a press statement from the World Bank the PBS did not start up until late in 
2006 and was to last for only 14 months. 
 
First, if we compare the annual PBS amount for 2006/07, i.e. US$ 401 million, with the current 
account deficit in 2004/05 excluding official transfers like foreign aid, which was US$ 1,763 
million, then we see that the PBS is of considerable importance in reducing the current account 
problem. To illustrate the point further, PBS brings in as much foreign currency in 2006/07 as 50 % 
of total exports from Ethiopia did during 2004/05. Second, if we compare the PBS with the total 
amount of foreign aid given to Ethiopia in 2004, which was US$ 1,800 million, we see that the PBS 
accounts for almost 23 % of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Ethiopia. We also 
know that a relatively large share of the ODA to Ethiopia is given to projects and NGOs and hence 
did not go through Direct Budget Support. Thus, it seems that the PBS to some extent mitigates the 
negative effects of the suspension of DBS on the macroeconomy, but we need the figures to 
conclude on this issue. 
 
This preliminary discussion indicates that the magnitude of the PBS plays an important role in 
reducing the foreign currency problem of Ethiopia and maintaining macro balance, and that the 
programme has such a magnitude that it will also help in fostering economic growth. 
 
Finally, the donor community also threatened to reduce aid over time if the political turmoil was not 
handled adequately and governance did not improve. Reducing aid would have tremendous 
implications for the Ethiopian economy in the coming years and jeopardise the recent good 
economic performance.6 First and foremost, the vital import requirements (petroleum products, 
technical equipment and construction materials) would not be available for entrepreneurs and 
development projects, and economic growth would be reduced. Moreover, such a move would 
imply that the Millennium Development Goals would not be met. Figure 2 illustrates the importance 
that increased aid has in meeting these goals. 
 
 
                                                     
6 It is necessary to underline that reducing aid to Ethiopia in a situation where more aid is promised may also strain the 
relations between the donor community and the Government. However, the political implications of aid giving are beyond 
the scope of this report. 
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Figure 2. Ethiopia’s ODA requirement to meet the Millennium Development Goals 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2006b) 
 
 
As can be seen, it is estimated that achieving the MDGs requires huge increases in aid flows. 
Moreover, several other challenges need to be addressed before Ethiopia can come onto a path 
towards achieving all the MDGs. The MDG of reducing poverty is discussed next. 
3. Strategies and prospects for poverty reduction 
In this section, I will discuss (in line with the ToR) the challenges for the Ethiopian poverty 
reduction strategy as specified in the PASDEP, and the aims therein. In section 3.1, I assess the 
poverty analysis in the PASDEP and whether this is coherent with the strategies. Then in section 
3.2, I review how pro-poor the growth strategy is, and look at the prospects for poverty reduction. 
Finally, section 3.3 contains a discussion on how the PASDEP balances growth with the 
distributional aspect. 
3.1 Poverty analysis and the strategies for poverty reduction  
Ethiopia’s new five-year poverty reduction strategy, the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained 
Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), was endorsed by the House of Peoples' Representatives in 
May 2006. The main aim is to increase economic growth and, as a minimum, to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals. The plan contains eight strategies: (1) A massive push to 
accelerate growth  - commercialisation of agriculture and promoting much more rapid non-farm 
private sector growth; (2) geographical differentiation – including urban issues; (3) reducing 
population growth; (4) reducing gender discrimination; (5) constructing infrastructure; (6) risk 
management and reducing vulnerability; (7) scaling up service delivery to reach the MDGs; and (8) 
increasing employment.  
 
The PASDEP addresses the volatility of growth (in particular agriculture), population control, 
health and water issues, policies and institutions, investment requirements, building human capital 
through education and skill enhancement, the need to acquire new technologies in partnerships with 
international companies, and the development of infrastructure (roads, electricity, telecoms). 
Moreover, the PASDEP also rises the important issue of unleashing the growth potential of 
Ethiopian women and enabling them to participate in the economy on an equal footing with men. 
All of these issues are vital for high economic growth in a country like Ethiopia, and lay a sound 
foundation for the strategies for implementation of the policies to achieve the goals. 
 
CMI REPORT ECONOMIC PROSPECTS FOR ETHIOPIA R 2006: 17 
 11 
The relationship between the poverty analysis and the strategy for poverty reduction is clear, even 
though the poverty analysis as spelled out in the document seems a bit shallow. Moreover, since the 
strategy requires a 7 % annual growth in agriculture, which is very ambitious, more attention should 
have been paid to how this growth will be achieved in the long run. Despite rather detailed 
description of inputs, no analysis is given on how the different components will translate into 
income generation and how large the overall agricultural growth will be. PASDEP also lacks an 
analysis of what the major obstacles to agricultural growth have been and there are no attempts to 
explain why agriculture only contributed 0.3 % to growth over 1993 – 2003. Such an analysis 
would then be the foundation for a strategy specifying how these obstacles would be tackled under 
the PASDEP period.  
 
The challenge in agriculture is aggravated by the fact that many of the subsistence farmers are under 
the national food security programme, which aims to improve the food security of 16 million people 
within 5 years, and make 6 million of these food self-sufficient within 3 years. Hence, the focus will 
be to enable these people to cope with the harsh environment, and that may entail giving up on 
achieving the 7 % growth for these people since high-yield technology often implies higher risk. 
Moreover, a discussion of regional differences in agricultural potential should have received in-
depth analysis due to its crucial role in achieving the growth goal. However, we should expect that 
the Government is already developing a more detailed plan for how to achieve the agricultural goals 
in the PASDEP, as this is mentioned for several of the agricultural strategies. 
 
In general, it is my opinion that Chapter 1 in the PASDEP, which analyses the present situation and 
spells out the strategies, seems rather short in comparison to its importance. However, there is 
always the issue of limiting the length of the PRSPs as to make them more accessible to a wider 
audience, but perhaps other sections should be cut back. Much of the underlying work seems to be 
thorough and of high quality, although I have not had an opportunity within the timeframe of this 
project to study them in detail. There is, however, a clear understanding of the magnitude of the 
poverty challenge, and assessments have been undertaken both to analyse what could be learned 
from the previous PRSP, what one can learn from others (long-term analysis on sources of growth 
carried out by MoFED that, among other issues, draw lines to Asian countries’ growth experiences), 
and what the financial and political requirements for achieving the goals would be in different 
scenarios. Moreover, the PASDEP uses the Millennium Development Goals Needs Assessment in 
its analysis and planning. Taking into account the thorough description and analysis in SDPRP, in 
which international specialists from the University of Oxford participated, I am not surprised to see 
the high quality of the PASDEP. 
3.2 Degree of pro-poor growth strategy and the prospects for 
poverty reduction 
In this section I discuss whether the PASDEP will make sure that Ethiopia keeps on track towards 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals and look at the degree to which the growth strategy 
is pro-poor. Looking at the figures for 2000, there were 31 million people in Ethiopia that lived 
below the national poverty line of US$ 0.45 a day. MoFED studies show that a 1 % increase in 
growth reduces poverty by 1.3 %, and it has been shown that a growth rate of about 8% p.a. is 
necessary in order to achieve the MDG of halving income poverty by 2015 (PASDEP 2006). This is 
higher than the annual average growth rate in Ethiopia of 5 - 6 % during the 13-year period from 
1993 to 2005/06. On the other hand, much of the expenditures and investments in the PASDEP are 
focused more on poverty reduction (see section 3.3 for details) than earlier, so we would expect that 
a 1 % increase in growth would reduce poverty more than the 1.3 %. Nevertheless, without much 
faster growth than in the previous decade, Ethiopia will not have the revenue to finance essential 
health, education, infrastructure, and other services important to poverty reduction. 
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If we look at Ethiopia’s growth experience in shorter periods, there may be reason for some 
optimism. In the years prior to the drought, i.e. 1998/99 to 2000/01, Ethiopia experienced an 
average annual economic growth of 6.6 % (see table 1 above) despite the border war with Eritrea 
from 1998 to 2000 that killed 70,000 people and put some of their agriculture out of production. If 
we discard the rebound that occurred after the drought, which resulted in 11.3% growth in GDP, 
and concentrate on the two consecutive years, we see that the annual average growth was 7 %. 
Hence, history shows that a high growth rate is possible in this country, and that coping with 
droughts is of major importance in order to avoid setbacks. Moreover, it is important for Ethiopia’s 
ability to prosper that the tense situations with Eritrea and Somalia do not escalate into armed 
conflict or war. The administrative capacity, the manpower and the peoples’ focus must be directed 
towards poverty reduction if they are to have any chance of achieving the goals. 
 
Another challenge to poverty reduction is the high population growth rate, ranging between 2.2 % 
(WB estimate) and 2.8 % (PASDEP estimate). Clearly, it poses a serious challenge to have 1.5 – 2.0 
million new mouths to feed every year and to create jobs for the growing population where the 
agricultural plots are already too small to support their consumption. This challenge is adequately 
addressed in the PASDEP with a range of different actions proposed. The main poverty-reducing 
vehicle in the PASDEP is investment in and expenditure on agriculture. The aim of making 6 
million people food secure and improving food security for another 10 million is a substantial 
contribution towards poverty reduction since most of these people will at some point in time be 
counted as poor. Moreover, development aims in agriculture are largely directed towards poverty 
reduction. Poverty reduction is also addressed in most of the other sectoral strategies in the 
PASDEP, and some examples are given here. 
 
In the Road Investment strategy, poverty reduction is incorporated through a special programme 
designed to built rural roads to reach the poor in remote areas. As they state: “The Ethiopian 
landscape is characterised by widespread poverty, rugged terrain, skewed distribution of population 
and inadequate road network and transport services. This has resulted in weak spatial integration, 
predominance of rural settlements in isolation from one another and low economic activity. All 
these together have constrained the growth process and compounded the poverty problem, making it 
a vicious circle.”  
 
The Government launched a study on Poverty Impact of Transport Operations in selected corridors 
in 2004, and now the ‘Transport and Poverty Observatory: A Yearly Customary Assessment’ is 
conducted annually to monitor the poverty-reducing impacts of road investment at local community 
and at household level. The PASDEP specifies that 10,500 km of low-class rural roads are to be 
built in the period, while 7500 km of regional roads and 3900 km of federal roads are to be built. 
Moreover, clear targets of reducing walking distances for the rural population to the nearest road are 
presented. While indicating that the poverty aspect of road investment is taken seriously, it is not 
possible to assess the degree of pro-poor spending in this sector without going into the detailed 
background documentation. 
 
The PASDEP strategy of developing the tourism industry also incorporates ideas on how to use this 
as an instrument for reducing poverty by promoting links to marginalised constituencies – 
especially women, rural areas, and poor communities. Moreover, it is an aim to link attractions and 
local communities to increase the sharing of the benefits of tourism and to link communities with 
handicraft services supply and support services. Moreover, a series of Sustainable Tourism 
Eliminating Poverty pilot projects will be identified and conducted with the technical collaboration 
of the World Tourism Organisation. The intention is to improve the distribution of tourism income 
to poor people in the community. Again, it is difficult to assess the degree of poverty reduction in 
relation to the spending and investments in the strategy. 
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Very few poor Ethiopians are connected to the electricity grid, and this aggravates poverty due to 
deforestation, difficulties for children to do homework in the evening and so on. One important 
component of the PASDEP is the large-scale rural electrification programme, called the Universal 
Electrification Access Program. Recalling that 90 % of the poor live in rural areas, this may be 
important for poverty reduction. The aim is to increase access to 24 million people, which implies 
50 % coverage within five years. 
 
Finally, the ToR for this report asks for an assessment of whether increasing the per capita incomes 
of the poorest from US$ 1 to US$ 2 per day within five years is realistic.7 The PASDEP scenarios 
all have a 7 % growth rate for agriculture, which is the sector that 90 % of the poor are dependent 
on for their living. We also know that the actual average growth figures conceal important 
differences between households – some may have a much higher growth while others will lag 
behind. However, if for the purpose of illustrating the challenge we assume that all the poor earn 
US$ 1 and that they all experience a growth rate of 7 % a year, then they will have US$ 1.5 after 5 
years. An annual per capita growth rate of 15 % is necessary for all of the poor in order to double 
their income over 5 years. Given that the most optimistic scenario in the PASDEP suggests a 
growth rate of 7-8 % per capita, this goal of doubling the incomes of the poorest is clearly not 
realistic. However, the goal of achieving the MDGs is clearly within reach under the current 
macroeconomic regime if the PASDEP is implemented, if Ethiopia does not suffer from extensive 
drought and if the political situation stabilises. The large requirement of funding the PASDEP is 
clearly a challenge that the donor community must discuss.  
3.3 How does PASDEP balance growth and inequality issues? 
The PASDEP seems to balance economic growth and inequality issues in a sound manner given the 
widespread poverty in Ethiopia. When the majority of the population can be characterised as poor, 
then general policies aimed at the sectors where a majority of the poor is working will be effective 
in reducing poverty and reducing inequalities. The best example in the PASDEP is from agriculture 
where 90 % of the poor earn their living. Even though many of the policies apply to all types of 
farmers, the sum of the impact will be that inequality will go down because the poorest will benefit 
more than the non-poor farmers. One concrete example is the application of modern inputs. Many 
of the better-off farmers already use such inputs, and hence, this policy will probably reduce the 
gaps in income between the poor and the non-poor farmers. 
 
The total Government expenditure, both recurrent and capital, consists of a relatively high share of 
poverty targeted expenditure for 2004/05, approximately 57% of overall spending excluding special 
programmes. Again, this reflects the challenge of widespread poverty in Ethiopia. However, when 
40 % of the population is defined as poor and 57 % of government spending is targeted on them, it 
seems to be a rather strong effort for equalising incomes since there are many government outlays 
that benefit the poor even if they are not directly targeted towards them (governance expenditure). 
The PASDEP specifies that the share that goes to poverty reduction will be 80 % in 2009/10, which 
seems very high. However, a more thorough assessment of this point and the definitions of “pro-
poor spending” is necessary if we are to conclude more firmly on the degree of inequality reduction 
in the Government spending. 
 
Moreover, it is evident that the PASDEP is only concerned about the inequality between the poor 
and the non-poor to the extent that the aim is to lift the poor over the poverty line. Hence, this will 
contribute to smaller inequalities if the economic growth of those above the line is not larger than 
the growth of those below. I do not find any discussion of income-inequality reducing policies in 
                                                     
7 However, I did not find any such goal in the draft PASDEP of December 2005. 
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the plan. However appropriate at this stage where the main aim is to reduce poverty, it is important 
to highlight that measures taken in the PASDEP period could alter future income distribution in an 
irretrievable manner. Therefore, it is a problem that no attention is paid to income distribution 
issues.  
 
The rough categorisation of income classes, i.e. in poor and non-poor, may be appropriate in 
Ethiopia’s situation since most of the population is below the poverty line of US$ 1 a day, and since 
most of those above that line are not very rich. Many of the targets and actions are directed towards 
all households in areas where the programme is being implemented, or the selection of the 
recipients of the programme is not specified in case there are not enough resources for universal 
coverage. Take delivery of health services, for example. In the lowest resource scenario there will 
be a roll-out of the Health Service Extension Programme, with the establishment of two HEWs and 
a low-level health post for each kabele over the next five years. Hence, there is no taking into 
account the differences in health needs between the kabeles, for example between poorer and less 
poor areas.  
 
A similar approach is used in the education sector. However, it seems that some of the financing of 
the ESDP III will be borne by the students themselves: “The cost that will be shared by pre-tertiary 
(Grades 11 & 12), TVET and tertiary level students will also be another source to finance ESDP-
III.”, p. 87. School fees in a country like Ethiopia will hamper economic growth and prevent many 
talented youngsters from attending school because they are too poor to afford it. 
 
PASDEP does take into account that growth tends to be unevenly distributed. However, no attempt 
is made to formulate policies that would change the distribution from the better-off towards the 
poorer. It is evident that if growth were accompanied by less inequality, then the economic growth 
would lead more people out of poverty compared to a situation where growth leads to higher 
inequality. MoFED studies show that a 1 % increase in growth reduces poverty by 1.3 %, but the 
same growth increases inequality by 1.1 %. Hence, we expect increasing inequalities during the 
PASDEP period. This should be analysed, and counter-measures should be proposed.  
4. Suggested issues to follow up 
4.1. The PASDEP commits the Government to developing several sub-sectoral agricultural plans 
that will be vital for the goal of achieving the 7 % annual agricultural growth target at the same time 
as securing food self-sufficiency for vulnerable subsistence farmers. Hence, we should expect that 
the Government is already developing more detailed plans, and one issue for the Norwegian 
Embassy could be to follow up this work with the Government and discuss the different scenarios 
that rise from such planning. The financial need is evident, and the donor community will probably 
at some point discuss how to contribute to the financing gap. In that case it would probably be 
valuable for the embassy to monitor the work on these plans closely.  
 
4.2 Norway has a vast experience in energy management and development, and has recently 
included oil expertise in foreign assistance. There seems to be potential for further engagement from 
Norway in fostering institutions in Ethiopia necessary for exploring and developing the energy 
sector in the country, and perhaps particularly focus on natural gas exploration and usage of gas to 
produce nitrogen-based fertilizer. 
 
4.3 In the present situation, it is my opinion that it is very difficult to predict Ethiopia’s inflation 
three years ahead. Inherently difficult, this task is made much harder by the fact that we do not 
know when and how the expected increase in aid will occur, and how this will affect the other 
economic dispositions of the government. In light of the expected increase in aid flows to Ethiopia 
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it is important to keep an eye on inflation in the future. Credit growth is needed to fuel the growing 
economy and to secure financing for the projects that actually drive the economic growth. 
Ethiopia’s huge ambitions for economic development pose large challenges in managing monetary 
policies and developing the appropriate instruments for liquidity forecasting and bank supervision.  
 
4.4 The long-term vision of the Government to make Ethiopia one of the top 10 tourist destinations 
in Africa may be followed up. Norway has a long experience in attracting high-value tourists that 
seek exotic adventures. This may also be an opportunity to express concern over the continuous 
insecurity due to the conflicts with Eritrea and Somalia and to underline that the Government’s 
efforts to attract tourists are undermined by the constant threats of violence. 
 
4.5 It is a concern for inequality that some of the financing of the education strategy will be 
contributed by the students themselves: “The cost that will be shared by pre-tertiary (Grades 11 & 
12), TVET and tertiary level students will also be another source to finance ESDP-III.” (PASDEP, 
p. 87). School fees in a country like Ethiopia will hamper economic growth and prevent many 
talented youngsters from attending school because they are too poor to afford it. This should be of 
major concern, and an issue that should be raised with the Government. 
 
4.6. The PASDEP is only concerned about the inequality between the poor and the non-poor to the 
extent that the aim is to lift the poor over the poverty line, and there are not any discussions of 
inequality-reducing policies in the plan. Hampering growth and creating a more unequal society, it 
is unfortunate that no attention is paid to distributional issues. This may be appropriate in Ethiopia’s 
situation since most of the population is below US$ 1 a day, but to set the focus on this issue the 
embassy could ask the Welfare Monitoring Unit (which was established with Norwegian aid grants) 
in MoFED to undertake such a study, and CMI could be a sparring partner in this work. 
 
4.7 The preliminary discussion of the impact of the suspension of General Budget Support indicates 
that the magnitude of the PBS plays an important role in reducing the foreign currency problem of 
Ethiopia and maintaining macro balance, and that the programme has such a magnitude that it will 
also help fostering economic growth. However, the indications given in this report are tentative and 
require further work in order to draw any firm conclusions. This could be undertaken in a follow-up 
study if the figures are made available. 
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GLO-2028. Etiopia – konkretisering av oppdrag 
 
Bakgrunn 
 
Det vises til brev fra Norad til CMI av 16. januar 2006, med bestilling av faglige tjenester fra CMI 
v/dr. Espen Villanger til ambassaden i Addis Abeba, med en ramme på i størrelsesorden 2 
månedsverk i 2006.  
 
Innenfor denne bestillingen, konkretiseres følgende oppdrag: 
 
Desk-studie om den makroøkonomiske situasjonen i landet og utsiktene med hensyn til 
fattigdomsreduksjon.  
 
Innhold 
 
Når det gjelder den økonomiske situasjonen i 2006 og forventet utvikling fremover, vil følgende 
spørsmål være sentrale: 
• Forventet vekst i BNP for 2006 er på 7%. Er dette realistisk og hva innebærer det mht vekst 
pr. capita? Hvordan fordeler veksten seg på sektorer og på rurale vs. urbane strøk?  
• Hvilke konsekvenser antas den økende inflasjonen å få for den makroøkonomiske 
utviklingen? 
• Hvordan har økende petroleumspriser påvirket budsjettet for 2005/2006? Er det mulig å si 
noe om kortsiktige og langsiktige trender basert på en stabilt høy/evt. stadig økende 
oljepris?  
• Myndighetene har redusert subsidiene på import av olje og gassprodukter - hva antas å være 
de langsiktige konskvensene av dette?  
• Hva har stansen i utbetaling av Direct Budget Support (DBS) å si for den nasjonale 
økonomien? Hvor mye av tapet vil eventuelt Protection of Basic Services (PBS) 
programmet, øremerket sektorstøtte utbetalt direkte til regionene, demme opp for?    
 
Når det gjelder planer og utsikter med hensyn til fattigdomsreduksjon, bes følgende spørsmål 
belyst: 
• Etiopia har nettopp vedtatt en ny fattigdomsstrategi (PASDEP) som har som målsetting å 
doble inntekten til den fattigste delen av befolkningen fra 1 USD til 2 USD i løpet av fem 
år. Synes dette realistisk, gitt landets befolkningsvekst, den makroøkonomiske utviklingen i 
landet, den politiske situasjonen og tiltak nedfelt i strategien? 
• Hvilket samsvar er det mellom fattidomsanalyse og strategi for fattigdomsreduksjon? Hvor 
fattigdomsrettet er veksten, og i hvilken grad tar strategien sikte på å gjøre den mer 
fattigdomsrettet? Hva er forholdet mellom vektlegging av vekst generelt og fokus på 
fordeling? 
• Etiopias fattigdomsstrategi er relativt ensidig rettet inn mot vekst i landbruksproduksjon 
(herunder stor grad av subsistence farming). Hvor mye av de siste års økonomiske vekst 
kan tilskrives landbrukssektoren, i forhold til andre sektorer som industri- og servicesektor i 
urbane strøk? Hvordan slår økonomisk vekst i urbane strøk ut på 
fordelingsmekansimer/vekst i rurale strøk? Er det mulig å si noe om kortsiktige og 
langsiktige trender i prisutvikling for sentrale eksportprodukter fra Etiopia, spesielt kaffe?  
CMI REPORT ECONOMIC PROSPECTS FOR ETHIOPIA R 2006: 17 
 18 
• Hvor realistisk er gjennomføringen av PASDEP, gitt manglende bistandsstøtte til 
sentraladministrasjonen og etiopiske myndigheters implementeringskapasitet? 
 
De to hovedtemaene og underpunktene er delvis overlappende. Det viktigste vil være å få et godt 
bilde av de sentrale utviklingstrekkene og politiske prioriteringene når det gjelder økonomi og 
fattigdomsreduksjon. Grunnlagsdokumenter vil bl.a. være IMFs rapport ”The Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix” av 05.05.06 og Etiopias nye 
fattigdomsstrategi (PASDEP). 
 
Gjennomføring 
 
Oppdraget gjennomføres innen en ramme på 10 arbeidsdager. Utkast til rapport oversendes 
elektronisk til ambassaden og til Norad senest fredag 21. juli 2006, for kommentarer. Det legges inn 
rom for noe kommunikasjon og oppfølging etter at utkastet er oversendt, samt innarbeidelse av ev. 
justeringer i endelig versjon.   
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